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Beatrice Foods: Injury to Competition
John F. McClatchey
I. INTRODUCTION
"11N JULY 30, 1965, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
filed a two-count complaint' against Beatrice Foods Co., a
Chicago-based dairy products company, and the Kroger Co., a Cin-
cinnati-based food retailing chain. The complaint related to Bea-
trice's sales of dairy products to
Kroger and Kroger's competi-Thn3 AUTHoR: JoHN F. MCrCLATCE tors in seven different markets2
(B.A., Yale University; LLB., Harvard
University) is a member of the Ohio in West Virginia, Ohio, and
Bar and a practicing attorney in Cleve- Kentucky, specifically Beatrice's
land, Ohio. sales of private label and brand
label products to Kroger, and
brand label products to Kroger's competitors. The charges stem-
med mainly from an agreement between Beatrice and Kroger nego-
tiated in late 1961 and early 1962.
The agreement was the result of negotiations initiated by Kroger
with Beatrice and four of Beatrice's competitors. 8 Kroger had asked
each of the five milk producers to submit proposals for bottling
milk under Kroger's private label.4 During the course of the negotia-
1 Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. a 17,309
(FTC 1965). The original complaint was later modified to include discounts given
by Beatrice to two other customers, A & P and Garden Fresh Markets. The FTC,
however, did not charge these customers with any violations. Beatrice Foods Co.,
[1967-1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,068 (FTC 1967).
2 Of the seven markets, five were in West Virginia, the sixth contained stores on
both sides of the Ohio River in Ohio and West Virginia (which was called the "River
area"), and the seventh market was in Eastern Kentucky. Both the hearing examiner
and the Commission found that only the five West Virginia markets were relevant to
the Beatrice Foods case. The River area market was excluded because Beatrice had no
customers there other than Kroger; the Kentucky market was excluded because a local
milk pricing law controlled Beatrice's sales to Kroger there. Beatrice Foods Co., [1967-
1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,045, at 21,289 (FTC 1969).
3 Air. Francis X. Casserly handled the negotiations for Kroger because he was ex-
perienced in arranging a similar changeover to Kroger private label milk in another
of Kroger's divisions. Initially, Casserly contacted four of Beatrice's competitors, Val-
ley Bell Dairy, the Borden Company, Fairmount Foods Company, and Broughton's
Farm Dairy, Inc. Beatrice was not contacted because Beatrice's containers were not
acceptable to Mr. Casserly. Mr. G. C. Stollings, one of Beatrice's general managers,
contacted Mr. Casserly after hearing of the negotiations. Stollings assured Kroger's
representatives that Beatrice could package milk in the type of containers Kroger de-
sired. As a result of Beatrice's container assurances, Mr. Casserly invited Beatrice to
submit a proposal for the private label milk contract. Id. at 21,291-92.
4 Although Kroger was most interested in acquiring private label milk from one
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tions it became evident that the Kroger contract would go to the
lowest bidder.5 After several modifications, Beatrice's proposal was
accepted by Kroger in April, 1962, approximately 5 months after
the opening of negotiations between Kroger and the five milk pro-
ducers. Under the terms of the agreement between Beatrice and
Kroger, Beatrice supplied Kroger with private label milk and other
dairy products in the seven markets. The prices of the private label
milk sold to Kroger were lower than prices Beatrice charged for its
brand name milk.6 Beatrice's service on the milk sales to Kroger
also varied from the service given to other customers.7
The first count of the complaint charged Beatrice with giving
of the five dairy producers, other dairy items were involved in the contract negotiations.
Mr. Casserly, Kroger's representative, testified that the Fairmount and Beatrice fluid
milk bids were almost indistinguishable. He stated that the only significant difference
was with respect to the bids on cottage cheese (a comparatively significant item in
dollar volume). On that item, Casserly testified that he considered the constant price
offered by Beatrice to be more favorable than Fairmount's fluctuating price. Id. at
21,299.
5 The Commission was quite critical of the negotiations and the conduct of Mr.
Casserly. The majority opinion concluded from Casserly's testimony that the Kroger
negotiator's primary concern was to get the lowest price possible from the producers.
Casserly evidently encouraged the spirited bidding by informing four of the producers
that he already had a 20 percent discount offer from Broughton Dairy (which was a
distortion of the truth) and by being very secretive about the other dairies' offers. Id.
at 21,300.
6 The pricing arrangement eventually adopted in the Beatrice-Kroger agreement was
a novel one for the market under consideration. According to Commissioner Jones,
this novel pricing presented serious obstacles to Beatrice's attempted cost justification
defense. As the majority opinion stated:
Kroger and Beatrice chose to use a pricing system in which prices were
ultimately determined by the cost of raw milk plus a fixed differential to
cover distribution expense and profit. Competitors of Kroger, on the other
hand, continued to purchase under the normal list-price-less-discount structure
which bore no necessary relationship to the cost-plus formula but which was
governed by local competitive conditions. Id. at 21,309 (emphasis added).
The Commission further pointed out that the prices to Kroger were based upon aver-
age distribution costs which were not necessarily related to actual distribution costs.
Due to the cost-plus formula pricing and the use of average distribution costs, Beatrice's
prices to stores close to the plant were occasionally higher than its prices to more distant
stores. Id.
7 The Commission's opinion described the pricing and servicing arrangement as
follows:
The prices finally arrived at in the course of the negotiations were stated in
terms of specific dollar amounts, but, unlike prices charged by Beatrice to
other customers, which were based on a list price less a percent discount, the
prices to Kroger were intended by the parties to vary from month to month
in accordance with the Federal Milk Marketing Order. Also, unlike Bea-
trice's sales to others, sales to Kroger were to be made on a "stripped service"
basis whereby Kroger personnel performed all of the functions in the nature
of in-store services that Beatrice's route salesmen otherwise performed. The
claimed saving to Beatrice of the expense of these services lies at the base of
the attempted cost justification defense. Id. at 21,288.
INJURY TO COMPETITION
illegal price discriminations to Kroger in violation of section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act.8 The complaint charged:
[T]he effect of such discriminations in price has been or may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in the purchasing, processing or sale of fluid milk and other dairy
products and to injure, destroy or prevent competition between
(1) Beatrice and its competitors in the manufacture, processing, dis-
tribution and sale of such products, and (2) retailers paying
higher prices and competing retailers paying lower prices for Bea-
trice's said products.9
In general, section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it un-
lawful for a seller to discriminate in the price of commodities of like
grade and quality purchased in interstate commerce for use, consump-
tion, or resale in the United States where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen or injure competition.
Section 2(a) also contains a cost justification defense, which
generally permits a discrimination that makes only due allowance
for differing costs in serving different customers.10
Section 2(b) n provides a second defense for the seller charged
with a violation of section 2(a). Section 2(b) validates an other-
wise unlawful price discrimination if the lower price is granted in
good faith to meet the equally low price of the seller's competitor.
The second count of the complaint charged Kroger with the
violation of section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 2 which
8 Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). The Robinson-Patman amend-
meats, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964), were added to the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38
Stat. 730 (1914), in 1936. For an examination and analysis of the Robinson-Patman
Act, see F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIZMaNAON UNDER THE RoBiNsoN-PATMAN ACr
(1962, Supp. 1964). Se also E. KNTNER, A ROBINsON-PATmAN PRIMR (1970).
9 Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 17,309,
at 22,461 (FTC 1965).
1 0 Section 2(a) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, when either or any
of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular pos-
session or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Pro-
vided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make
only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities
are to such purchasers sold or delivered . . . . 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
"115 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
12 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964).
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makes a buyer liable for knowingly inducing or receiving a pro-
hibited price discrimination."3
On September 26, 1967, the hearing examiner rendered an ini-
tial decision'4 in which he absolved both Beatrice and Kroger from
all liability on the ground that there was no proof of the requisite
probability of injury to competition at either Beatrice's or Kroger's
level. The examiner found that Beatrice had established the meet-
ing competition defense, but had failed to establish the cost justifica-
tion defense. He held that Kroger had not violated section 2 (f)
because there was no evidence that it knew or had reason to know
that Beatrice's prices were not cost-justified or extended to meet com-
petition.' 5
In a split decision,:' rendered on December 1, 1969, the Com-
mission absolved Beatrice from the section 2(a) charge, but found
Kroger liable for violating section 2(f). A majority, which in-
cluded Commissioners Jones, Elman, and apparently Nicholson, 8
upheld the meeting competition defense of Beatrice over the dis-
sents of Commissioners Dixon and McIntyre. Commissioner Dixon
stated that Beatrice did not stop at meeting the competition, but
rather beat its competitor's prices. He reasoned that the meeting
competition defense cannot be used to "justify . .. the calculated
and deliberate undercutting of a competitor's price."' 9  According
to Commissioner McIntyre's opinion, the burden of establishing the
meeting competition defense rests upon the party raising it and
13 The complaint specifically referred to the negotiations with Beatrice and to the
contract which resulted from the negotiations. The complaint further stated that Kroger
"knew or should have known" that the prices received from Beatrice were discrimina-
tory. Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 17,309,
at 22,461 (FTC 1965).
14 Beatrice Foods Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. a 18,068
(FTC 1967).
15The meeting competition and buyer liability issues are discussed in Borowitz,
Beatrice Foods: Meeting Competition and Buyer Liability, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
54 (1970) (infra in this issue).
16 The positions of the individual Commissioners are important because Commis-
sioners Nicholson and Elman have left hte Commission and have been replaced by
Chairman Kirkpatrick and Commissioner Dennison.
17Beatrice Foods Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,045
(FTC 1969).
18 Commissioner Nicholson did not write a separate opinion. According to a brief
notation following the majority opinion, Nicholson dissented only as to the finding
that Kroger was liable for a section 2(f) violation. Id. at 21,314.
19Id. at 21,315. Commissioner Dixon further stated that in order to take advantage
of the meeting competition defense, the seller must in good faith believe that the com-
petitor's price he is attempting to meet is itself lawful. Id.
INJURY TO COMPETITION
Beatrice failed to carry that burden of proof.20 Commissioners
Jones, Dixon, and McIntyre agreed on the lack of primary-line
(seller level) injury to competition, the existence of secondary-line
(buyer level) injury, the insufficiency of Beatrice's cost justification
defense, and the existence of Kroger's violation of section 2 (f).
II. THE IssuE s
As the facts of the case dearly indicated, there was no question
that Beatrice discriminated in the price of commodities of like grade
and quality purchased by competing buyers in interstate commerce.
As the Commission's majority opinion stated: "No one denies that
the Beatrice-Kroger arrangement contemplated and resulted in dif-
ferent prices charged by Beatrice to Kroger and to Kroger's com-
petitors on some products in some market areas and at some times."21
In reaching this conclusion about Beatrice's discriminatory prices, the
Commission examined both the prices charged by Beatrice to some
of Kroger's competitors and the savings that Kroger's competitors
would have gained had they been charged the same prices as
Kroger.22
However, the case contained several important issues that the
Commission examined in considerable detail. These were as follows:
(a) The standard to be applied in determining whether Bea-
trice's price discrimination caused the requisite probability of injury
to competition at the seller's or primary level, that is, at Beatrice's
level;
(b) The standard to be applied in determining the requisite
probability of injury to competition at the buyer's or secondary
level, that is, to competition between Kroger and its competitors, in-
cluding (1) the significance in such determination of Kroger's in-
creased costs of handling private label milk as opposed to the al-
legedly lower costs of buyers handling brand label milk, and (2)
the significance of the alleged differences in value between Beatrice's
private label milk and its brand label milk;
20 Id.
2lId. at 21,301.
22 The prices charged to Kroger for fluid milk for the months of June 1962 to
October 1963 ranged from 59.9 cents to 70.7 cents per gallon. During some of the
same months Beatrice charged Kroger's competitors prices which averaged from 71.1
cents to 98 cents. In one of the relevant markets, Beatrice charged one of Kroger's
competitors prices 27 percent higher than prices charged Kroger. The savings to some
of Kroger's competitors, had they been charged the same price as Kroger, would have
ranged from $1,000 to $18,000. Id. at21,301-02.
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(c) Beatrice's meeting competition defense;
(d) Whether Kroger was liable for a section 2(f) violation.
The latter two issues are treated in a subsequent article in this
symposium.13 Issues (a) and (b) above will be considered in the
remainder of this article.
III. INJURY TO COMPETITION:
PRIMARY OR SELLER LINE
The language of the Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clay-
ton Act is both flexible and ambiguous.24 While it is true that
Congress was primarily concerned with the injurious effects price
discriminations would have at the secondary or buyer-line level,2"
the Supreme Court in its 1960 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.26 deci-
sion recognized that section 2 (a) was meant to protect the primary'
or seller-line competitors of a discriminatory seller. In this respect,
23 Borowitz, supra note 15.
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964). See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 343,
362 (1968) (dissenting opinion), where Mr. Justice Harlan criticizes the Act's lan-
guage as being "notoriously amorphous."
In discussing this language, it has been said: "The statutory language is so broad
as to be almost useless as an aid to deciding whether a particular discrimination is
proscribed. The legislative history is also confusing .... ." Note, Unlawful Primary
Line Price Discrimination: Predatory Intent and Competitive Injury, 68 CoLM. L
REv. 137, 139 (1968).
2 5 See generally F. ROWE, supra note 8, at 11-23; Sherwood, Robinson-Patman Act
Primary Line Injury: Meanderings from Porto Rico to Utah - and Beyond, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 304, 305 (1969). See also FEDERAL TRADE CoMIssSIoN, FINAL
REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Con&, 1st Sess.
85-86 (1935), which concluded that the small independent rivals of the large chain
stores would continue to lose ground as long as the chains continued to offer lower
prices to consumers. Part of this competitive advantage was attributed to the ability
of the chains to wrench discriminatory concessions from their suppliers. But see Adel-
man, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 222, 232 (1955), where the author states that the FTC's own data showed that
more than 85 percent of the competitive advantage garnered by the chain stores was a
direct result of their own internal operating efficiencies.
26 363 U.S. 536 (1960). One holding of this decision, with Mr. Chief Justice War-
ren writing the opinion, was that the statutory phrase "discriminate in price" merely
meant a price differential. Id. at 346-53. For the opinion of the court of appeals on
remand, see FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
27 Section 2 of the original Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914),
was always interpreted as prohibiting a primary line "substantial lessening of competi-
tion." National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 F. 733, (2d Cir. 1924); Mennen Co. v. FTC,
288 F. 774 (2d Cir. 1923). See also F. ROWE, supra note 8, at 7. This proscription of
predatory conduct by sellers was carried over to the Robinson-Fatman Act. 80 CONG.
REC. 9415 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Utterback). For an extensive analysis of
the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, see C. EDWARDS, THE PRIcE DIs-
CRIMINATION LAW (1959). See also Madntyre, The Role of the Robinson-Patman
Act in the Antitrust Scheme of Things - The Perspective of Congress, 17 ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION 325 (1960).
INJURY TO COMPETITION
the Robinson-Patman Act embodies the original Clayton Act's pro-
scription of certain discriminations in price "when the effect . ..
may be substantially to lessen competition ...in any line of com-
merce .. ."28
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, after stating the
necessary jurisdictional elements, 29 reenacts the original Clayton
Act's "substantial lessening of competition" test. In addition, how-
ever, section 2 (a) of the Act proscribes price discriminations "where
the effect of such discrimination may be ... to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination.... ."30 The legisla-
tive history of the addition is not illuminating,"1 and both the
courts and the Commission, in interpreting the Act, have had to
consider whether a "substantial lessening of competition" provides
a different standard than "injury to competition [with the discrimi-
nating seller)."
From an antitrust standpoint, the addition should represent mere
surplusage. The focus should always be on the vigor of competi-
tion within the market. Certainly, mere injuries to certain specific
competitors should be tolerated if, on the whole, the competitive
level in the market remains satisfactory.32 As the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee stated in 1955:
2S Ch. 323, § 2,38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
29 Basically, the Act will apply only when there are (1) sales (2) of commodities
(3) of "like grade and quality" (4) in commerce. See F. RowE, supra note 8, at 36.
Even the interpretation of the jurisdictional elements has been less than dear. For
example, there has been considerable debate about the meaning of "like grade and
quality." See id. at 62-76. Compare FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966) (labels
or consumer preference do not differentiate products for the purpose of determining
grade or quality), with Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1966)
(proof of comparable consumer preference and "salability" of a product is necessary to
establish a prima fade case of like grade and quality).
30 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1964); see note 10 supra.
31 Ostensibly, the drafters of the Act merely injected the addition to plug a loop-
hole. Under the original Clayton Act it would be possible in a localized monopoly to
have the local monopolist driven out of business by a new and predatory monopolist
without having a "lessening of competition." The market would be at the same level
of competition both before and after the predatory action. It was felt that this situation
would be covered by the Robinson-Patman "injury to competition" test. As Congress-
man Utterbach stated, the amendment was not intended to cover competition in gen-
eral; it was only to focus upon "the effect of the discrimination upon immediate
competition with the grantor or grantee." 80 CONG. REc. 9415 (1936). For a cit-
dsm of this rationale, see Sherwood, supra note 25, at 310-12.
a2 An unfortunate controversy has raged over whether the Act was meant to protect
competition or competitors. From an antitrust standpoint, the Act should only protect
competition. See Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 112 (1954); F. ROWE, supra note 8, at
126-32. However, there has too often been a tendency to look at the harm to certain,
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[T]his Committee recommends that analysis of the statutory "in-
jury" center on the vigor of the competition in the market rather
than hardship to -individual businessmen. For the essence of com-
petition is a contest for trade among business rivals in which some
must gain while others lose, to the ultimate benefit of the con-
suming public. Incidental hardships on individual businessmen
in the normal course of commercial events can be checked by a
price discrimination statute only at the serious risk of stifling the
competitive process itself.83
Indeed, the word "substantially" 3 4 has been read to qualify not
only the lessening of competition in an entire line of commerce,
but also the injury to competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the discriminations.3" The FTC has stated:
"The difference between the two concepts, if there be one, is slight
since the Commission has interpreted the word 'substantially' as
modifying both phrases in this portion of the Act.""0  The central
issue under the injury to competition test is whether the seller's
price differences reflect the kind of competition fostered by the anti-
trust laws generally or competition that is so predatory and de-
structive that it will be inimical to effective market rivalry. 7
It has been clear for many years that, given the proper juris-
dictional facts, the existence of predatory intent by a seller will
specific competitors. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967);
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50 (1948).
33 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 164 (1955).
34 The exact interpretation of the word "substantial" has been the subject of a long
and arduous history in the courts. Much of the controversy has stemmed from the Su-
preme Court's decision in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). In that de-
cision, the Court stated:
It would greatly handicap effective enforcement of the Act to require testimony
to show that which we believe to be self-evident, namely, that there is a "rea-
sonable possibility" that competition may be adversely affected by a practice
under which manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some customers
substantially cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of these
customers. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
The FTC, especially in its cease and desist orders, has tended to follow this re-
strictive approach. See, e.g., Thompson Products, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1252 (1959).
Courts of appeals, however, have usually rejected a per se approach. See, e.g.,
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), petition
for cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). As one court stated: "[lt is implicit in the
Act that discriminations which are negligible and which at best have a remote effect
on competition are not within its prohibitions." E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d
152, 155 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958). Most commentators agree
that to fit the Robinson-Patman Act into the general antitrust policies of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, "minute inequalities" among competitors should not be proscribed.
See C. EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 639; F. ROWE, supra note 8, at 132-36.
35 p. ROWE, supra note 8, at 125.
36 Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 116 (1954).
37 See E. KINTNER, supra note 8, at 111.
INJURY TO COMPETITION
support a finding of probable injury to competition at the primary
line.3" Predation has been a difficult concept to define. One au-
thority in the field has defined predatory intent as "(1) an intent
to sell to one set of customers at a lower price than short-term profit
maximizing considerations would dictate, (2) for the purpose of
driving out of business a competitor (3) who is a significant market
influence, (4) regardless of the competitor's efficiency."8 9 The Com-
mission would seem to concur with this definition. At times, how-
ever, it has concentrated on the purpose requirement and has
skimped on requirements (3) and (4) .40
Proof of the illicit intent may be made either directly or indi-
rectly. Direct proof consists of tangible manifestations of the sub-
jective state of mind of the discriminator. 41 Thus, such evidence as
memoranda, 42 statements,4 3 conversations of officials of the corpo-
rate defendant,44 and even the use of industrial spies 5 has been
accepted as direct proof of a predatory intent. Indirect proof of
predatory intent may consist of certain acts of unfair competition,
46
or of circumstantial evidence such as "below cost" sales.47 At any
S8 See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d
277 (7th Cir. 1966); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 906 (1965); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 366 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary
Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1965); H. J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut
Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Porto Rican American
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
858 (1929) (equivalent result under original Clayon Act).
39 Sherwood, supra note 25, at 316. For the sake of comparison, that author has
collected other attempts to define the subjective state of mind. See, e.g., Turner,
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1340
(1965) (defining predatory pricing as "selling at a lower price than customary profit-
maximizing considerations would dictate, for the purpose of driving equally or more
efficient competitors out of all or the greater part of the market"); Note, supra note 24,
at 141, which defines predatory intent as an "intent to destroy one's competition with
resort, if necessary, to means not justified by one's short-term self-interest."
40 See F. RowE, supra note 8, at 144.
41 Sherwood, supra note 25, at 215-16.
42 See General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885 (1954).
43 See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966).
44 See Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
906 (1965); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957).
45 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
46 See, e.g., E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944), where the
defendant, among other things, fraudulently falsified bills of lading to obtain ad-
vantageous freight fares, used iron oxide to artificially color his product (chicory), and
falsely represented that his competitor used sugar beet molasses and other foreign sub-
stances to fortify its product.
47 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). See also
F. ROWE, supra note 8, at 146-51.
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rate, the proof of predatory intent, be it direct or indirect, is of
immense aid in defining the proscribed act. In fact, the illicit act is
defined by the proven predatory intent.3 The Supreme Court has
stated: "Good intentions will not save a plan otherwise objection-
able, but knowledge of actual intent is an aid in the interpretation
of facts and prediction of consequences. ' 49
The proven intent, combined with discriminatory pricing, al-
lows the inference that the discriminator has sufficient market
power to eventually cause the competitive injury.50 However, dis-
criminatory pricing without any proof of predatory intent raises
analytical problems in predicting a causal relationship between the
price cuts and future injury to competition. In 1965 the FTC at-
tempted to resolve this analytical problem in its Dean Milk Co.51
decision.
The Dean Milk case concerned the quantity discount system
which Dean Milk Company had instituted in the Evansville, Indiana-
Henderson, Kentucky market area. This system had been in effect
for 8 years. A majority of the Commission found illegal territorial
price discrimination based on below "delivered cost" prices and
competitive injury. The Commission stated:
A conclusion that there is a "reasonable possibility" of adverse
competitive effects upon competition on the primary or seller level
does not require findings of either actual injury to competition or
actual injury to competitors, nor does it require a finding of an in-
tent on the part of a discriminator to injure or destroy a competi-
tor.52
Thus, the Commission looked at various market factors which in
connection with the price differentials would warrant a finding of
"probable injury to competition." Several of these factors are: a
significant diversion of business from the seller's competitors; di-
minishing profits to the seller's competitors; the inferior size and
48 See Sherwood, supra note 25, at 317. See also J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR
COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLIcY 49-54 (1954).
49 Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372 (1933). See also F. ROWE,
supra note 8, at 144.
50 See F. ROWE, supra note 8, at 144; von Kalinowski, Price Discrimination and
Competitive Effects, 17 ABA ANTTRUST SEcTION 360, 366 (1960); Sherwood, supra
note 25, at 317. Professor Sherwood has interpreted Commissioner Elman's dissent
in the Dean Milk case (see text accompanying notes 54-57 infra) as stating that if a
conclusive presumption of competitive injury is raised by actual proof of preditary
intent, the burdensome and often imprecise determination of injury can be eliminated.
Id.
51 [1965-1967 Transfer Binderl TRADE REG. REP. 5 17,357 (FTC 1965).
52id. at 22,528.
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economic power of the seller's competitors; and price differentials of
an economically significant depth." According to the Commission
majority, these factors could cause future injury in the market; in the
long run, the small competitors could be financially crippled, the
local market could develop monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies,
and there could be a significant reduction in the number of sellers in
the market.
The majority's reasoning was strongly criticized in Commissioner
Elman's dissent. 4  Elman stated that before Dean Milk entered the
local market there were a number of small, marginal dairies in
competition. Dean's entry in itself would account for the failure
of some of the marginal producers.5 In addition, the company cap-
tured perhaps less than 2 percent of the market throughout the 8
years.5 6 Commissioner Elman reasoned that this fact negated any
immediate attempt on the part of Dean Milk to monopolize or
dominate the local market.57
After the Dean Milk case, the Commission seemed to abide with
this new rationale in its National Dairy Products Corp.58 decision.
In National Dairy, National offered a 3-week, two-for-one promo-
tional scheme. This half-price offer met with spectacular and un-
expected success. There was no quantity limit on the offer, and
53 Professor Rowe has compiled a list of factors which he feels tend to confirm the
existence of probable competitive impairment:
(a) Monopoly or overpowering position of the seller in wider markets;
(b) Agressive objectives toward smaller and weaker rivals;
(c) Deep, sustained undercutting of rivals' prices, or elimination of an es-
tablished price spread between a "premium" and a lesser product;
(d) Persistent sales below the seller's "cost;"
(e) Actual or impending demise of a seller's sole rival in a particular market.
F. ROWE, supra note 8, at 161-62.
54 Commissioner Elman, whose 9-year term on the FTC ended on September 25,
1970, was a strong and persistent critic of his fellow Commission members for not en-
couraging the free competitive process. In a recent speech in St Louis, Mr. Elman
fired a parting shot at the FTC as he argued for a radical structural reform among
the regulatory agencies whereby they would, among other things, be relieved of their
"adjudicative responsibilities" and would become investigators, prosecutors, and policy
formulators. See Wall Street J., Aug. 12, 1970, at 4, col. 1; id. at 12, col. 4 (Midwest
ed.).
r1 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 22,566.
56 Id.
57 One commentator, who agreed with Commissioner Elman, has attempted to ra-
tionalize the majority's findings on the basis of a presumption of illegality from Dean's
long-term, below-cost pricing. See Sherwood, supra note 25, at 345. However, the
majority illogically dismissed a charge of discrimination causing injury in the Lexington
area because of insufficient data. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at
22,543.
58 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 18,027 (FTC 1967).
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consequently customers ordered large volumes.59 The local compe-
tition experienced a temporary loss of sales, but over the long run
no producer incurred a loss and the demand in the local area was
greatly increased by National's "breakthrough." Despite these facts,
the Commissioner found a probable future injury:
The evidence establishes that respondent, if not satisfied with its
market share, could and would engage in offers that not only
substantially divert trade but are so designed that other sellers
cannot compete. As so motivated, the probability of an adverse
effect from respondent's price cuts is established and a dose study
of the market is not required .... The test of competitive injury
is "one that necessarily looks forward on the basis of proven
conduct in the past....60
In 1967, the Supreme Court seemed to lend support to the Com-
mission's nonpredatory, future injury approach with the Utah Pie
Co. v. Continental Baking Co.61 decision. The Utah Pie case arose
from a claim for treble damages by the Utah Pie Co. against three
defendants - Pet Milk Co., the Carnation Milk Co., and the Con-
tinental Baking Co. - which had allegedly injured the plaintiff's
competitive position and violated section 2(a) by selling frozen
fruit pies at discriminatory prices in the Salt Lake City market. It
was shown that, prior to 1958, the fruit pie market in the Salt Lake
City territory was essentially an oligopoly. At that time Utah Pie
had produced only fresh fruit pies and had suffered a loss of $6,000.
In 1958 it built a new plant and entered the frozen fruit pie busi-
ness. Although the company realized that it was entering an oli-
gopoly, competing against multimarket, multiproduct firms, it cal-
culated that it could save enough in shipping costs to be competitive.
Utah Pie was fortunate in entering the market at the right time.
The market was a rapidly expanding one, growing from about
57,000 dozen pies in 1958 to almost 267,000 dozen pies in 1961.
Because of its transportation cost savings and an aggressive price
campaign, during the 1958-1961 period Utah had net incomes of
$7,000, $12,000, $7,500, and $9,000 and market shares of 67o, 35o,
45.5%, and 45.3% respectively.
Naturally, the three multimarket sellers responded to the in-
creased competition of Utah Pie. At trial, the jury explicitly found
that there had been no conspiracy beween the three. However,
50 Id. at 20,420.
601d. at 20,421.
61 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
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it did find that there had been territorial price discrimination in the
Robinson-Patman sense. There were price differentials between the
Salt Lake City market and other surrounding markets that were not
fully cost-justified.
Based on these price differentials, the trial court awarded a ver-
dict for Utah Pie. The court of appeals reversed,62 stating that
while there had been price differentials, there was no evidence sup-
porting a finding of probable injury to competition. 6 The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case.64 It upheld the jury verdict
by pointing out the presence of predation 5 and below-cost sales.6
In addition, the Court stated:
The jury was entitled to consider the potential impact of Conti-
nental's price reduction absent any responsive price cut by Utah
Pie.... The jury could rationally have conduded that had Utah
not lowered its price, Continental, which repeated its offer once,
would have continued it, that Safeway would have continued to
buy from Continental and that other buyers, large as well as small,
would have followed suit. [The juryl could also have reason-
ably conduded that a competitor who is forced to reduce his price
to a new all-time low in a market of declining prices will in time
feel the financial pinch and will be a less effective competitive
force.
Even if the impact on Utah Pie as a competitor was negligible,
there remain the consequences to others in the market ....
[T]here were nine other sellers in 1960 who sold ... 12.7% of
the total market. In 1961 there were eight other sellers who sold
... 8.2% ... although the total market had expanded. .... 67
Thus, the Court seemed to lend support to the FTC's Dean Milk ap-
proach.6"
In 1968, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
62 Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1965).
631d. at 135-36.
64 The case was remanded to the court of appeals because that court in holding that
the plaintiff had failed to prove a prima fade case, had declined to rule on several issues.
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ordered a new trial after finding
the jury's determination of damages to be unsupported by the facts. Continental Baking
Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 396 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1968).
65 386 U.S. at 696, 702-03.
66 Id. at 699.
671d. at 699-700.
68 The Utah Pie case has been criticized by both legal practitioners and economists.
See Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE
LJ. 70, 84-85 (1967) ("Utah Pie must rank as the most anticompetitive antitrust deci-
sion of the decade. This is no mean achievement in view of strong competition from
such decisions as Brown Shoe [370 U.S. 294 (1962)], Vop's Grocery [384 U.S. 270
(1966)], Clorox [386 U.S. 568 (1967)], and Consolidated Foods [380 U.S. 592
(1965)]."); Sherwood, supra note 25, at 364-70.
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the Commission's Dean Milk decision. 69 The court, while basing
its decision chiefly on the absence of a causal relationship between
Dean Milk's lower prices and any adverse effect on its competitors,
distinguished the Utah Pie case on the ground that, unlike the de-
fendants in Utah Pie, Dean did not engage "in the kind of aggres-
sive, persistent, below-cost sales of the magnitude that occurred in
Utah Pie."7  In short, the Seventh Circuit treated Utah Pie as a
predation case.
In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
construed Utah Pie as holding that when evidence of predatory
intent is found, the Robinson-Patman Act reaches an erosion of
competition incident to a drastically declining price structure.71
In Beatrice Foods Co.,72 the Commission stated that a finding of
primary-line injury might be based either on proof of predatory in-
tent or on a market analysis sufficient to raise a reasonable probabil-
ity of injury to competition. The Commission found neither a suf-
ficient market analysis to support a finding of probable competitive
injury, nor a sufficient showing of predatory intent. Most signifi-
cantly, in dealing with the Supreme Court's Utah Pie decision, the
Commission stated: "The Supreme Court held essentially that the
evidence presented was sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of
predatory intent.' 7 3
In discussing the facts in Beatrice, the Commission attributed the
closing of one competitor's plant and the discontinuance by other
competitors of several distribution points to reflections of changing
market conditions that did not, by themselves, prove any causal
relationship between price concessions made to Kroger and the sub-
sequent fortunes of either Beatrice or its competitors.7 4
The Beatrice decision appears to reflect a return by the Commis-
sion, at least in the absence of an undefined "market analysis," to a
predatory intent standard for finding probable injury to competi-
tion at the primary line. The decision also reflects the importance
of the causal relation issue in primary-line cases, as well as a will-
ingness by the Commission to attribute reverses of the seller's
competitors to something other than the seller's price discrimination.
69 Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968).
7o Id. at 708.
71Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 179 n.12 (5th Cir. 1967).
72 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,045 (FTC 1969).
73 Id. at 21,302.
74 Id.
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IV. INJURY TO COMPETITION:
SECONDARY OR BUYER LINE
A. In General
In the Beatrice case, the Commission found that the mere exist-
ence of substantial price differentials between competing purchasers
in a price sensitive atmosphere is sufficient to give rise to an infer-
ence of reasonable probability of injury to competition at the sec-
ondary or buyer's line .7  There is nothing new in this approach.
The Supreme Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.76 stated that sub-
stantial price differentials justified an inference of secondary-line
injury. In Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC,77 a circuit court of ap-
peals, citing Morton Salt, stated:
[I]t seems well-established that where the record indicates a price
differential substantial enough to cut into the purchaser's profit
margin and discloses a reduction which would afford the favored
-buyer a significant aggregate saving that, if reflected in a resale
price cut, would have a noticeable effect on the decisions of
customers in the retail market, an inference of injury may properly
be indulged.78
In Beatrice, the respondents claimed that the price differentials
were not fairly indicative of the size of the advantage given to the
favored buyer, Kroger. In fact, they claimed that an examination
of other relevant factors would show that Kroger did not receive any
competitive advantage from the price differentials. Two of these
factors are particularly noteworthy. The first involved the asserted
increased costs borne by the favored buyer. The second involved
the asserted value differentials between private label and brand label
products. Both of these factors were alleged to have eliminated any
apparent competitive advantage, thus precluding any injury to com-
petition.
B. Increased Buyer's Costs ("Functional Discounts")
The issue raised by this section is whether a nominal price dif-
ferential to a favored buyer may be offset by added costs or func-
tions performed by this favored buyer. More specifically, is this the
75Id. at 21,303.
76 334 U.S. 37, 50 (1948).
77348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
78 Id. at 680. The majority in Beatrice cited Foremost Dairies and United Biscuit
Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966)
in support of raising the inference of reasonable probability of injury to competition at
the secondary line. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 21,303. See
also F. ROWE, supra note 8, at 180-95.
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type of price discrimination which will cause a competitive injury
on the secondary line ?79
The issue is best presented in terms of this hypothetical situa-
tion: Is there a probability of injury to competition at the buyer's
level where the seller charges Buyer A a price of 10 and Buyer B
a price of 15; A performs functions such as stacking merchandise,
providing architectural design services, and employing outside sales-
men, all at a cost of 5; B does none of these things, making the
equivalent costs of A and B attributable to the product on resale 15 ?o
One possible approach to this question would be to recognize
that the performance of several marketing functions could be han-
dled by an integrated distributor. Thus, the amount of reimburse-
ment or price differentiation granted to the integrated buyer by the
supplier could be "reasonably related to the expenses assumed by
the buyer.""' Under this method, it would be an acceptable defense
to equate the price differential with the buyer's increased costs., 2
The FTC, however, has evolved a different approach to the ques-
tion. Accordingly, the seller will be liable under section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act unless he can cost justify the difference in
selling prices on the basis of his own cost savings, rather than the
buyer's increased costs. In addition, the seller will be liable under
section 2(d) unless the additional functions performed by A are
79 See generally C. EDwARDs, supra note 27, at 313-17 (1959); E. KINTNER, supra
note 8, at 138-44 (1970); F. RoWE, supra note 8, at 188-93.
80 In Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955), the Commission recognized the
justification for these discounts:
Functional discounts long have been a traditional pricing technique by which
sellers compensated buyers for expenses incurred by the latter in assuming
certain distributive functions. The typical functional discount system provided
for graduated discounts to customers classified in accordance with their place
in the distributive chain, namely, wholesaler, retailer and consumer in dimin-
ishing amounts. They were intended to reflect, at least from an economic
viewpoint, the seller's estimates of the value of the marketing functions per-
formed by the various classes of customers. Id. at 207.
81 Id. at 209.
8 2 This approach was apparently the one originally utilized by the Commission.
See Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955), discussed in Note, FTC Reexamines Func-
tional Discounts in Integrated Industries, 56 COLuM. L. REv. 626 (1956); Comment,
Regulation of Business - Robinson-Patman Act - A Further Look at Functional
Discounts, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 659, 676-78 (1956). In Doubleday the Commission
specifically objected to the trial examiner's holding that a seller must justify his prices
based upon his own costs, rather than the buyer's increased costs. 52 F.T.C. at 209 n.7.
For an analysis of this position and its subsequent evolution in the FTC, see F. ROWE,
supra note 8, at 190-93.
83 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964). Section 2(d) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract
for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of
such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in considera-
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amenable to treatment under that section and are so treated, that is,
unless B is given the opportunity to obtain the lower price by pro-
viding the functions described.84
The increased costs to Kroger involved in the Beatrice case re-
lated to the number of deliveries and the activities of Beatrice's
routemen. In serving Beatrice brand customers, the routemen called
at least once every workday, moved the milk from the truck to
the cases, moved old milk forward in the cases and put new milk
in the back, spent time on ordering, billing, and invoicing, and
sometimes returned to a store several times a day to keep the cases
supplied.85  On the other hand, in delivering private label products
to Kroger, the routemen called once every 5 days and unloaded the
goods on a loading dock, after which Kroger employees did all the
remaining work.8
In the Beatrice decision, the Commission resolved the competi-
tive injury issue on the grounds that there was a failure of proof.8 7
After first noting that it is no defense in a price discrimination case
that the favored purchaser incurred additional costs, and that a de-
fense exists only where the seller can justify his favorable price on
the basis of his own cost savings, the Commission went on to state:
"The record contains no evidence as to the amount of additional
costs incurred by Kroger."8 8  In addition, the Commission stated
that any evidence of Kroger's increased costs should have been
geared to specific store locations. 89
tion for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in
connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any
products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person,
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal
terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or
commodities.
84 Sea Mueller Co., 60 F.T.C. 120 (1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
85 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 21,290.
8 Id.
87Id. at 21,306-07.
88 Id. at 21,307. The Commission went on to state:
Indeed, one can assume that the incremental cost to a large chain store of
moving milk from its delivery platform to the dairy cases and maintaining
these cases would be comparatively insignificant. Krogers use of centralized
billing and long-range order procedures, on the other hand, would probably
result in cost savings to it rather than in additional expenses. Id.
89 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,045 at 21,307 (FTC 1969).
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Thus, it is unlikely that respondents in future secondary-line
cases will be able to prove lack of injury to competition on the buyer
level unless the record contains detailed factual evidence of the fa-
vored buyer's increased costs on an individual store basis, and the
record also establishes that the difference in prices do not exceed
such additional costs. Creating such a record will be a formidable
job, and, even if done, the seller will still be exposed to a section
2(d) charge if he cannot establish that he made the lower price
available to the favored buyer's competitors in exchange for the per-
formance of functions that they were reasonably able to perform.
C. Private Label vs. Brand Label Products
In its 1967 decision in Borden Co. v. FTC,90 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit examined the issue of injury to competi-
tion at the secondary line. The facts disclosed that in 1956 and 1957
Borden began selling private label milk to retailers in the South,
especially in Tennessee and South Carolina. Prior to 1956, only
Borden brand milk had been sold to these southern retailers. Bor-
den was able to accomplish this label changeover by introducing
private label packaging of milk in its southern plants. The court
noted that the average price discrimination between the private label
and brand label was $1.19 per case. The court further pointed out
that wholesalers and retailers testifying in the case had admitted
that private label milk was interesting to them only at a price of
$1.50 to $2.00 less per case than Borden brand milk. The Borden
court found the wholesalers' and retailers' attitude quite under-
standable. Through national advertising and promotion, Borden
had created a consumer preference for the Borden label. The court
stated that the wholesalers and retailers knew that milk carrying a
private label rather than the Borden label could only be sold at a
much lower price than Borden brand milk. Therefore, these whole-
sale and retail purchasers of the private label milk were willing to
buy from Borden only at a substantially lower price.
The court concluded that Borden's price discrimination did not
violate section 2(a) at the secondary level of competition. Accord-
ing to the Borden majority:
[W]here a price differential between a premium and nonpremium
brand reflects no more than a consumer preference for the premium
brand, the price difference creates no competitive advantage to the
90 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967).
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recipient of the cheaper private brand product on which injury could
be predicated. . . . The record disdoses no evidence tending to
show that Borden's price differential exceeds the recognized con-
sumer appeal of the Borden label. Nor has it been suggested
that the prices are unreasonably high for Borden brand milk on the
one hand, or unrealistically low for the private label milk on the
other.91
In the Beatrice opinion, the Commission stated that some dif-
ferential between name brand and private brand products may be
tolerable under the Robinson-Patman Act, and that in a proper case
the differential between the two may be taken into account in de-
termining secondary-line injury. However, the Commission did not
find Beatrice to be such a case. The majority concluded that the
facts indicated that "Kroger, by its own action sought to deny the
value of any differential between name brand and private brand
products. 92 The most damaging fact was that Kroger usually sold
the private label products at a price equal to the brand name prod-
UCts. 93
V. CONCLUSION
In the primary-line injury to competition area, Beatrice is a
significant departure from the Commission's Dean Milk decision,
in which "probable injury to competition" was found on the basis of
a market analysis."" In the secondary line, Beatrice reflects little
change in the Commission's established approach to buyer-line in-
jury to competition, as supported by the Supreme Court in Morton
Salt. 5 The Beatrice decision indicates that respondents in future
cases will continue to have difficulty in successfully asserting the
defenses of increased buyer costs and private versus brand label
public preference.
Perhaps the two new Commissioners will add further gloss to
the Commission's treatment of these issues. °
911d. at 181.
92 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 21,307.
93 The majority examined several factors which they considered relevant in reaching
their conclusion that the Borden rationale was not applicable to the Beatrice facts. The
Commission pointed out that Kroger marketed the private label products very aggres-
sively, that the private label products were given favored shelf space in the stores, and
that Kroger even gave free samples of the private label products. Id.
94 See notes 52-53 supra & accompanying text
95 See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
98 See note 16 supra.
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